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Abstract
A class of dual-system theories of categorization assumes a categorization system based on
actively-formed prototypes in addition to a separate instance memory system. It has been
suggested that, because they have used poorly differentiated category structures (such as the
influential ‘5-4’ structure), studies supporting the alternative exemplar theory reveal little
about the properties of the categorization system. Dual-system theories assume that the
instance memory system only influences categorization behaviour via similarity to single
isolated instances, without generalization across instances. However, we present the results of
two experiments employing the 5-4 structure to argue against this. Experiment 1 contrasted
learning in the standard 5-4 structure with learning in an even more poorly differentiated 5-4
structure. In Experiment 2 participants memorized the 5-4 structure based on a 5 minute
simultaneous presentation of all nine category instances. Both experiments revealed category
influences as reflected by differences in instance learnability and generalization, at variance
with the dual-system prediction. These results have implications for the exemplars versus
prototypes debate and the nature of human categorization mechanisms.
Keywords: category learning, exemplars, prototypes, categorization, representation
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Instance Memorization and Category Influence: Challenging the Evidence for Multiple
Systems in Category Learning
The ability to categorize objects and events and to form conceptual representations of
those categories is a core cognitive capacity. Research on categorization in both psychology
and neuroscience has been heavily influenced in recent years by attempts to evaluate various
‘dichotomy’ frameworks such as the distinctions between implicit/explicit learning and rule-
based/similarity-based category learning (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Seger & Miller, 2010).
Particularly prominent amongst these distinctions is that between exemplar versus prototype
representation of categories, and debate over this distinction continues to be a core research
issue in categorization and learning. While at least initially exemplar and prototype theories
seem conceptually well differentiated, specifying what the debate is truly about has been
more difficult, especially in the broadening context of multisystem models where for some
the abstraction-based subsystem uses rules rather than prototypes (e.g., ATRIUM, Erickson
& Kruschke, 1998).
Exemplar theory (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984;
1986) assumes that people represent categories during learning by storing the experienced
instances of the categories in memory. This representation can still reflect some abstraction—
for instance, selective attention can moderate similarity to make within-category instances
more similar than between-category instances (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1986)—but the
representation is relatively unintegrated and unabstracted in that the individual exemplars are
assumed to be separately encoded. The probability of a new instance being classified into a
particular category is the sum of its similarities to the stored category instances relative to the
corresponding summed similarities for other categories. So the greater the overall similarity
to the instances of the category, the more likely a new case is to be classified into that
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category. In brief, memory for instances is crucial and the formation of new abstractions is, at
most, limited in the context of adaptive categorization.
In contrast, prototype theory (e.g., Blair & Homa, 2001; Homa, Rhoads & Chambliss,
1979; Homa, Sterling & Trepel, 1981; Posner & Keele, 1968; Smith & Minda, 1998; 2000)
assumes that categories are represented during learning by an actively integrated average or
central tendency of the observed instances, the category prototype. New instances are
categorized at test based on their similarity to various category prototypes, where the
probability of a particular categorization is proportional to the similarity of the instance to the
category prototype relative to other category prototypes. Hence the greater the overall
similarity to a category prototype, the more likely a new case is to be classified into that
category. In brief, long-term memory for specific instances is not required while formation of
new abstractions, that is actively integrated prototypes, is crucial for adaptive categorization.
Importantly, the exemplars versus prototypes debate is not about whether
prototypicality effects occur. Virtually everyone now agrees that a fundamental property of
most real world categories is that some instances are better, more typical, members than other
instances. Moreover, exemplar models would not be nearly as successful as they have been if
they could not provide some account of such effects (e.g., Nosofsky & Kruschke, 1992; but
also see the recent debate about potential prediction differences in typicality gradients in the
dot-distortion paradigm: Homa, Hout, Milliken, & Millikin, 2011; Smith, 2002, 2005; Zaki &
Nosofsky, 2004, 2007). Nor does anyone dispute that participants can remember particular
instances of categories or that these can influence categorization as demonstrated by the large
body of evidence for exemplar effects, which most notably occur even in the presence of
explicit and perfectly diagnostic rules (e.g., Allen & Brooks, 1991; Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos &
Brumby, 2010). In particular, it is worth emphasizing in advance that prototype theory does
not preclude the influence of instance memory on categorization or even categorization
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behaviour based solely on instance memory in some cases, as we describe below. Needless to
say, these complicating facts emphasize the importance of being clear about the key aspects
of the debate.
To be useful, categories have to add something; category membership knowledge
needs to improve adaptive functionality. Knowing that a particular animal is in the category
dog is not very useful if it does not help predict unseen properties. This “category influence”
can take many forms, for instance, it can influence the learnability of category instances as
shown in the experiments reported below. And there are a variety of perspectives in the
literature about what categories do; for example, the perspective embodied in Anderson’s
(1990; 1991) Rational Model is that categories are for optimized feature inference whereas
the emphasis in Pothos and Chater’s (2002) simplicity model is on representing information
efficiently. But most fundamentally category influence involves integration of information
from across the experienced instances of the categories in a way that improves prediction and
control. The particular entity nearby is apparently a dog. Dogs tend to be territorial and
protective as indicated by growling, in which case approach is inadvisable, but a wagging tail
can indicate they are friendly and that approach is safe. Not only do exemplar and prototype
theories make different predictions about how category integration occurs, but this difference
in proposed mechanisms for category influence is the fundamental difference between them.
The crux of the difference between prototype and exemplar theories is whether or not
category influence is the result of a separate, abstraction-generating, cognitive system distinct
from instance memory (Blair & Homa, 2001, 2003; Nosofsky, 2000; Smith & Minda, 2000,
2002). Specifically, does category integration as measured particularly by prototypicality
effects occur in a separate system from instance memory via an active process resulting in an
abstracted category prototype? Or is category integration fundamentally a passive process
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resulting from similarity to the category instances stored in a single memory system—
possibly moderated by selective attention, forgetting, and interference?
Once prototypicality and exemplar effects in categorization are both acknowledged to
occur, distinguishing prototype from exemplar representation can be conceptually, not to
mention pragmatically, quite difficult. However, one useful difference between the theories
follows from the conceptual distinction between a single system mediating categorization and
instance memory (exemplar theory) versus separate systems for categorization and instance
memory (prototype theory) and leads to the following crucial question: Does more than one
category instance influence a given categorization decision? Or does memory for instances
influence categorization only via a single nearest exemplar? Both Smith (2005) and Nosofsky
(2000) have specified this as a key issue while arguing from opposite theoretical positions. In
particular, Smith (2005, p. 47) specifies the theoretical distinction in terms of “...whether
exemplar generalization in memory and categorization is broad and collective – extending to
many related exemplars stored in memory – or whether it is focused and singular – extending
only to highly similar (nearly identical) exemplars.”
The view that the true (i.e., abstraction-generating) categorization system is mentally
separate from the instance memory system suggests the prediction that there should be a lack
of generalization between category instances when a new instance that needs to be
categorized queries the instance memory store. Obviously, specific category instances can be
memorized, and these instance-category pairings could be stored in an instance memory
system quite distinct from the prototype formed in a separate categorization system. So this
suggests a conceptually precise way in which exemplar and prototype theory can be
systematically specified and differentiated, especially in the historically popular binary
featured category structures: on the prototype theory, a response determined by the memory
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system, as distinct from the categorization system, should be the result of similarity to only a
single memorized category instance.
As a preview, the purpose of the present research was to evaluate this key issue of
lack of exemplar generalization in instance memory as distinct from generalization in a
putative categorization system. While the exemplars versus prototypes debate has usually
involved contrasting exemplar and prototype model accounts of a given data set and picking a
winner, such an approach does not directly address the key generalization issue, which is
fundamentally about the behaviour of the exemplar model. So rather than contrasting
exemplar and prototype models (as has been done numerous times in the past), we have
operationally evaluated exemplar generalization, exemplar “crosstalk”, by unpacking the
exemplar model’s behaviour. To emphasize, our focus is not on whether the exemplar model
can account for the data we present but rather on how it accounts for that data. When the
exemplar model determines the probability that a test case belongs in a particular category, it
calculates the overall similarity of the test case to the category exemplars (in contrast to
exemplars of other categories; the Appendix presents a formalization of this account). So the
issue of exemplar generalization/crosstalk reduces to looking at the exemplar similarity
components of the overall category similarity, specifically the proportion of overall category
similarity that is not due to the single nearest instance as the exemplar model is at least
conceptually compatible with wide or narrow generalization. If test item category assignment
is determined by similarity to a single nearest exemplar, then overall category similarity
should be only negligibly greater than the similarity to the single exemplar. On the other
hand, if multiple exemplars are contributing to overall category similarity when determining
test item categorization, then this exemplar crosstalk should be apparent in terms of more
than one exemplar contributing nontrivially to the overall category similarity. Before
discussing the critical problem of how to evaluate instance memory generalization in
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isolation from generalization in a categorization system, we need to make clear that the
hypothesis of nongeneralizing instance memory is not simply a straw man.
This position is most closely implied by the conclusions of Blair and Homa (2003) but
is also related to the narrow exemplar generalization argued for by Smith (2005) and others:
“Researchers have raised the possibility that participants learning categories based on binary-
valued dimensions (BVD) may simply memorize each member, rather than generalize across
members (Blair & Homa, 2001; Smith & Minda, 2000)” (Blair & Homa, 2003, p. 1293). If a
response is based on more than one instance in the memory system, then this system would
be likely to generate prototypicality effects, typicality gradients, etc., and the theoretical value
of a separate prototype-based categorization system would be much reduced both on the
grounds of parsimony and on the grounds of pragmatically differentiating the theories. In
effect, prototype theory’s separate memory store for instances would be generating
categorization behaviour in a similar way to exemplar theory’s single system thus calling into
question the conceptual and practical utility of a separate categorization system based on
prototypes.
Additionally, the recent debate about predicted differences in typicality gradients for
exemplars versus prototypes in the dot-distortion category learning paradigm has done little
to reduce the conceptual importance of non-generalizing exemplars to differentiating the
theories (Homa, Hout, Milliken, & Milliken, 2011; Smith, 2002, 2005; Zaki & Nosofsky,
2004, 2007). In this paradigm, participants make category endorsement judgments for
prototypes and for low, medium, and high distortions of a prototype. Smith (2002) argued
that exemplar theory necessarily predicts a flatter typicality gradient around the prototype
than prototype theory and that prototypes better account for the observed pattern of
responding. The intuitive argument for this (Smith, 2002) is to imagine a ring of exemplars
with an untrained prototype at the centre. Consider test items which approach the prototype
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along a straight line. As test items get progressively closer to the ring of exemplars, there
should be a sharp rise in category endorsement, but this typicality gradient should flatten out
for items within the exemplar ring because as the test item is getting closer to items on the far
side of the ring it is getting farther from exemplars on the near side of the ring. Zaki and
Nosofsky (2004) agree that this prediction is to some degree correct but argue that the data in
this paradigm are misleading due to methodological problems, for example test phase stimuli,
especially prototypes, being incorporated into the representation. Zaki and Nosofsky (2007)
further support this argument by providing evidence of higher rates of endorsement for high
distortions than for prototypes by simply including many high distortions in the test phase. In
response, Homa et al. (2011) argue that the conclusions of Zaki and Nosofsky (2004, 2007)
are in turn based on an artifact deriving from use of the single category endorsement
paradigm, and that false prototype enhancement effects largely disappear in a multi-category
paradigm. However, examination of the typicality gradients obtained by Homa et al. (2011)
suggests that they look rather more like the flat gradients that Smith (2002) ascribes to the
exemplar model than the steep gradients typical of the prototype, and in addition Homa et al.
did not report exemplar and prototype model fits to their results.
As is not uncommon in the exemplar versus prototype debate, the arguments are
becoming more and more complex, and there does not (at least yet) seem to be a clear winner
in the dot-distortion paradigm. Nor, in our opinion, is there likely to be one in the near future
as some of the key things that make the dot distortion paradigm interesting, such as the
complexity and apparent ecological plausibility of the stimuli, also make clear assessment of
the precise similarity relationships between the instances in individual participants difficult.
In addition, the complex nature of the stimuli seems likely to induce highly idiosyncratic
representations in different participants in part from large differences in selective attention as
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well as complex interactions with prior representations along the lines of the different
patterns people see when looking at the stars.
A priori, establishing differences between typicality gradients seems likely to
correspond to a considerably weaker theoretical contrast than to argue for the presence versus
absence of generalization across instances. Hence, the present research focuses on contrasting
exemplar theory with a dual-system prototype theory: In addition to specifying the behaviour
of the separate, prototype-based categorization system, this dual-system theory makes a clear
prediction for how the instance memory system should behave in a category learning task;
namely it computes similarity to only a single category instance without generalization across
category instances. This is the position strongly espoused by Blair and Homa (2003) and at
least partly espoused by Smith (2005). In addition, it makes clear, falsifiable predictions
about whether multiple instances influence categorization, as will be detailed below. To
evaluate these predictions behaviourally, there must be some way of separately detecting the
influence of both of these two systems on responding. In particular, there needs to be a way
of testing the hypothesized instance memory system, preferably uncontaminated by the
prototype-based categorization system, to see if only a single stored instance influences
categorization responding without generalization across instances.
Applying a classic neuropsychological methodology to a cognitive problem, Blair and
Homa (2003; also see Smith, 2005; Smith & Minda, 2000, 2002) not only proposed that the
prototype-based categorization system can be effectively ablated but argued that this is in fact
what has happened in many categorization studies supporting exemplar theory because they
have used ecologically implausible category structures. Specifically, a lot of support for
exemplar theory has come from studies using two categories composed of a small number of
poorly differentiated instances with features that are only binary-valued across instances (e.g.,
the 5-4 structure from Medin & Schaffer, 1978). In this context, “poorly differentiated”
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means that the prototypical features of one category occur quite frequently in instances of the
other category and vice versa. These structures are argued to be ecologically invalid because
most real word categories putatively have well-differentiated prototypes generated from
many instances composed of numerous features and are learned in contrast to far more than a
single other category. So binary-valued category structures with few instances do not
represent a reasonable simplification of the vast majority of categories which occur in the real
world, and as such, categorization performance on these categories tells us little if anything
about how the mind actually generates adaptive category-based behaviour.
From this dual system perspective, requiring people to memorize poorly differentiated
categories composed of binary-valued stimuli should have the useful consequence of
resulting in a failure of the categorization system to abstract category prototypes. This leaves
responding to be based solely on single memorized instances retrieved from the separate
memory system and so allows the influence of that system on responding to be directly
evaluated, uncontaminated by the prototype-based categorization system which has been
ablated and rendered irrelevant. Effectively, the argument is that the mind does not treat this
as a categorization task at all and so just deals with it as an instance memorization task where
some of the instances happen to share common labels.
Of all these problematic binary-valued category structures, arguably the most
influential is the widely employed 5-4 category structure from Medin and Schaffer (1978).
Blair and Homa (2003) proposed that this particular category structure, shown on the left in
Table 1, unduly favours exemplar representation because it encourages instance
memorization due to its small number of poorly differentiated instances (see also Smith &
Minda, 2000, for a similar line of reasoning). In this category structure there are five
instances of category A and four instances of category B, designated A1-A5 and B1-B4 at the
top left of Table 1. In addition, there are seven generalization test items, designated T1-T7 at
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the bottom of the Table. Each category instance is represented in a row of the Table and is
composed of one of two possible features on each of four feature dimensions.
In this context, Blair and Homa (2003) proposed a formal measure of a category
influence on category learning which they called “category advantage”. They had participants
learn the instances of the 5-4 category structure as an identification (rather than a
categorization) task over a series of trials with feedback where each of the nine instances was
assigned a unique label. Blair and Homa then compared performance in this identification
learning task with performance in a standard category learning task, where participants
learned to assign the instances to two categories. Category advantage is defined as higher
accuracy at a given point in learning for the categorization task compared to the identification
task once differences in guessing are controlled for, which is crucial because of the difference
in the number of responses in the two tasks (2 versus 9). So a significant category advantage
at any point in learning was argued to reflect a well-differentiated category structure having a
category influence on the speed of learning due to generalization between instances. In brief,
similarity among category instances influences their individual learnability. On the other
hand, the absence of a category advantage was argued to indicate little if any category
influence on learning due to generalization between instances. In that case, categorization
behaviour would simply be due to instance memorization just as in the identification learning
task.
Across several experiments with different stimulus sets, Blair and Homa (2003) found
no systematic category advantage for the 5-4 category structure as measured by accuracy in
the categorization task relative to the identification task. That is, participants were not able to
learn the 5-4 category structure in a categorization task any faster than they were able to learn
to assign the nine instances to nine unique outcomes, each with a different label, in an
identification task.
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Blair and Homa used this lack of a category advantage to argue that “the widely used
and influential 5-4 categories are learned chiefly by memorization, with no generalization
across category members” (p. 1300). More generally: “If one assumes that there is little or no
relationship between memorization and categorization, then the 5-4 category learning task
has little to do with categorization . . . .” (p. 1299). It follows that the enormous amount of
support that exemplar theory has received from binary-valued category structures is called
into question. Also, as we have argued above, this “generalization across category members”
is, indeed, important to systematically differentiate prototype and exemplar theory both
pragmatically and theoretically.
It is worth emphasizing that this is not just a minor methodological dispute over a
specific category structure, however influential that structure has been. Paradoxically the very
attributes of this structure which have been argued to be ecologically invalid, maybe even
eliminating much of the evidence for exemplar theory all at once, make it an ideal candidate
for evaluating the dual-system prototype theory described above: Categorization responding
in the absence of well-differentiated prototypes should exhibit no category influence but
rather be based solely on a single memorized exemplar retrieved from instance memory with
no generalization across category members. Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to
operationally evaluate this claim.
Experiment 1
The purpose of this experiment was to assess category influences on instance “memorization”
(Blair & Homa, 2003) using the poorly differentiated 5-4 category structure, shown on the
left in Table 1 (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). However, unlike Blair and Homa, we do not
contrast category and identification learning because we accept they have demonstrated an
absence of “category advantage” for this category structure (though we reconsider the
interpretation of this evidence in the General Discussion). It is worth noting that if we have
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been too quick to accept Blair and Homa’s evidence for the absence of a category advantage
for the 5-4 structure, then their argument is immediately invalidated. For instance,
identification learning of this structure may simply be harder than classification learning and
there may be a true category learning advantage which they did not detect. However, our
approach does not call into question their key empirical starting assumption, and it is also
worth noting that our evaluation of category influence and crosstalk similarity is relevant
even if this assumption is incorrect.
Rather than comparing categorization with identification learning, our approach was
to contrast instance memorization in the standard 5-4 category structure with instance
memorization in an even more poorly differentiated category structure. We generated this
low-differentiation category structure by swapping two of the instances in the standard
category A with two of the instances in the standard category B, as shown in the right-most
column of Table 1. It is not material that this low-differentiation structure is linearly
inseparable and accurate performance cannot be based on prototype representation: The
prototype-based system has been argued to already be uninvolved in learning the standard 5-4
structure anyway. Both conditions were otherwise identical.
(Table 1 about here)
A variety of different theoretical perspectives provide a practical rationale for
thinking that poorly differentiated category structures should be harder to learn than better
differentiated ones, including Pothos and Bailey’s (2009) concept of category intuitiveness
(see also Pothos et al., 2011, and Pothos, Edwards, & Perlman, 2011). Pothos and Bailey
used category intuitiveness framed in the context of unsupervised categorization and an
exemplar model to account for testing trial differences from standard feedback learning of the
5-4 structure. However, our specification of the low-differentiation condition was most
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closely dictated by the discussion of the relatively poor differentiation of the 5-4 category
structure itself as described in Smith and Minda’s (2000) consideration of thirty replications
of this category structure. Specifically, they evaluated the 5-4 categories in terms of structural
ratio as a measure of category differentiation (related to a similar concept from Homa,
Rhoads, & Chambliss, 1979), that is, the ratio of within category similarity (including self-
similarity) to between category similarity in terms of average numbers of features shared
between instances. The ratio for these categories is 2.4/1.6=1.5 where 1 represents a complete
lack of differentiation with identical instances in both categories. Hence these instances are
quite poorly differentiated1. However, our swapping the category assignment of two pairs of
instances from the standard to the low-differentiation condition (Table 1) resulted in even
poorer differentiation as measured by a structural ratio of 2.2/1.9=1.2, that is fewer shared
features within the same category and more shared features between categories. Before
moving on to why we were interested in learnability differences, it is worth emphasizing that,
while a variety of theoretical perspective predict these differences, our research does not
presuppose the truth of any of these perspectives. Rather our conclusions are based on the
learnability differences we observed as reported below.
The theoretical rationale for this instance swapping manipulation was simply that if
participants learn the standard 5-4 category task as an instance identification task, with no
category influence from other category members on responding, then it should not matter
how the instances are assigned to categories. The low-differentiation category structure
should be as easy to learn as the standard one and all the instances in both conditions should
be equally easy to learn because the participant is simply learning to assign a label to each
unique instance. On the other hand, if there is a category influence on learning, then the low-
differentiation 5-4 structure should be even harder to learn than the standard 5-4 structure,
Instance Memorization and Category Influence 16
and differences in instance learnability should correspond to differences in similarity across
instances.
Specifically, the dual-system perspective of prototypes plus memory for single
instances predicts no category influence for either learning condition because these poorly
differentiated structures do not give the prototype-based categorization system anything to
work with, leaving responding to be based solely on memorized single instances without
generalization. This implies that test accuracies on the different training items (A1-B4 in
Table 1) should not be systematically different from each other and the resolution of
ambiguities in terms of nearest single category exemplars for the generalization test items,
T1-T7, should be arbitrary (e.g., for the standard condition on the left in Table 1, T5 2121
shares an equal number of features with A4 1121 and with B3 2221). Test items should not
reflect the influence of multiple instances or the number of prototypical features as the
prototype based categorization system should have been effectively ablated. Generalization
test items with many features typical of the prototype of one category (e.g., T3 1111 for the
standard condition in Table 1) which match many exemplar features of that category should
be no more likely to be categorized as members of that category than instances with fewer
features (e.g., T6 2211 for the standard condition in Table 1) because neither matches a
training exemplar exactly and both have multiple ambiguous matches based on subsets of
features.
The single-system exemplar theory, on the other hand, is consistent with differences
in accuracy for the training items corresponding to a category influence in terms of
differences in similarity to multiple category instances. That is, category instances that are
similar to many other category instances and correspondingly dissimilar to instances in the
other category should be easier to learn than category instances that are not similar to
multiple instances in the same category and that are rather similar to instances in a contrast
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category. Likewise since categorization and instance memory are assumed to be part of a
single system, the influence of multiple instances on responding is consistent with
prototypicality effects in the generalization test items: items with many typical features of a
given category should tend to have a higher proportion of responses for that category than
items with fewer typical features because they will tend to be similar to many instances of the
category. Lastly, exemplar theory is consistent with a category influence in terms of
differences in learning and generalization test performance between the standard and low-
differentiation conditions based on differences in similarity relations across instances for the
two conditions.
Method
Participants
There were 40 participants in the standard and 41 participants in the low-differentiation
conditions, all undergraduate psychology students at Cardiff University.
Materials
The abstract category structure for the standard condition on the left in Table 1 is the
5-4 structure from Medin and Schaffer (1978). There are five instances of category A, four
instances of category B (at the top left of the Table), as well as seven generalization test items
(at the bottom of the Table). Each category instance is represented in a row and was
composed of features from four binary-valued stimulus dimensions as indicated by 1’s and
2’s in the Table. The low-differentiation condition on the right of Table 1 was generated from
the standard condition by swapping the category assignment for two pairs of instances: A1
1112 was switched with B3 2221 in the standard structure to be A1 2221 and B3 1112 in the
low-differentiation condition, and A3 1211 was switched with B2 2112 to become A3 2112
and B2 1211. In Table 1, the switched items are in bold in the low-differentiation condition.
All other training and test items were the same in both conditions.
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The stimuli were the alien insects from Johansen and Kruschke (2005). Four binary-
valued stimulus dimensions were randomly assigned to the four abstract category dimensions
for each participant in the standard and low-differentiation conditions. These four stimulus
dimensions were randomly chosen from a set of five possible dimensions—shape of the head
(round or square), orientation of the nose (up or down), length of the tail (short or long),
shape of the antennae (curved or straight) and leg number (eight or four)—and the fifth
dimension had a fixed value across all the stimuli for a given participant. In addition, the
polarity of the assignment of stimuli within each stimulus dimension was also randomly
assigned between participants as was the assignment of the category labels LORK and THAB
to the abstract categories A and B in Table 1. Each stimulus was displayed on a computer
monitor, and participants indicated their response by mouse clicking in a box containing one
of the category labels.
Procedure
The procedure for both the standard and low-differentiation conditions was the same
as the classification condition in Johansen and Kruschke (2005). Participants from both
conditions were run simultaneously, half in one condition and half in the other based on even
or odd participant numbers, and the participant instructions were identical throughout. The
instructions told participants that they should learn to assign the instances to categories and
would receive feedback. They were also warned that there would be a test phase at the end of
the experiment to evaluate how much they had learned and that they would not receive
corrective feedback during this phase.
Each training trial displayed one of the nine category instances from either the
standard or low-differentiation conditions shown at the top of Table 1. After making their
response, participants received feedback, either CORRECT! or WRONG!, the correct
category label was displayed above the stimulus, and participants were given up to 30
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seconds to study the correct answer. The message FASTER was displayed if they did not
make their initial response within 20 seconds of the start of the trial. They started the next
trial by clicking the mouse on a box which had the message “After you have studied this case
(up to 30 seconds), click here to see the next one.” If they did not start the next trial within
30 seconds of their initial response, the message FASTER appeared and then the next trial
started automatically.
In the training phase, the nine training instances in each of the two conditions were
presented in 25 randomly ordered blocks for a total of 225 training trials. After the training
phase, participants were instructed that they would be tested without feedback but that they
should base their responses on what they learned when feedback was being given. During the
test block, the nine training items and seven test items for the standard and low-
differentiation conditions (Table 1) were presented in random order. Participants were given
no feedback on each trial other than that their response had been recorded.
Results and Discussion
The averaged learning curves for all participants by condition, standard or low-
differentiation, are in the top panel of Figure 1 which shows a systematic difference between
conditions throughout the course of learning: the low-differentiation structure was
considerably harder to learn than the standard structure as measured by average accuracy
across sets of 5 blocks (F(1,79) = 35.053, MSE = 0.028, p < 0.001, in an ANOVA with
training condition and training block set as factors). In addition, the proportions of good
versus poor learners in reference to a learning criterion (≥ 0.75 in the last two blocks of 
training, as in Johansen and Palmeri, 2002), was much higher in the standard condition
(17/40 good learners) than in the low-differentiation condition (3/41) (2(1) = 13.48, p <
0.001). (Figure 1 about here) In fact, the differences in performance for the two learning
conditions occurred across the course of learning even in the relatively poor learners who did
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not ultimately achieve the ≥ 0.75 criterion as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. (We do 
not report the results for the best learners in this way as there were only three good learners in
the low-differentiation condition). Overall the standard category structure was easier to learn
throughout and resulted in higher performance at the end of learning compared to the low-
differentiation structure.
However, overall average accuracy does not tell the complete story. Importantly, we
need to ask whether there were response differences between category instances, and we need
to examine test generalization to new instances. In their study, Blair and Homa (2003)
reported neither of these analyses, but they are crucial for differentiating the dual-system
theory (a prototype-based categorization system plus a nongeneralizing memory for instances
system) from the single-system exemplar theory, particularly in the context of assessing
category influence.
Figure 2 shows the category A response proportions from the test phase for the nine
training and seven generalization test items in each training condition (Table 1) based on all
participants in both conditions. The dashed lines are the approximate 95% binomial
confidence interval around 0.5 and provide a useful reference for the amount of learning at
the end of training: All but one of the training items fell outside this interval in the standard
condition whereas all but two of the training items fell within this interval in the low-
differentiation condition. Thus the test phase results also show that accuracy on the individual
test items was generally higher in the standard condition than the low-differentiation
condition. (Figure 2 about here)
Further, there were systematic and stable differences in test trial performance within
the standard condition. Figure 3 shows performance by condition for good versus poor
learners, i.e., high versus low end of training accuracy, as specified in reference to the
learning criterion. For the standard condition, similar qualitative patterns of responding
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occurred in the good versus poor learners, e.g., A1, A2, and A3 (labels from the standard
condition in Table 1) were the best learned instances from category A and B3 and B4 from
category B. Also the generalization test item corresponding to the prototype of A, T3 1111,
was strongly assigned to category A while T7 2212 was quite strongly assigned to category B
in both. Importantly, these patterns of responding also correlate closely with the data from
Medin and Schaffer (1978), shown at the bottom of Figure 3, r = 0.94 for the good learners.
The contrast between good and poor learners in the low-differentiation condition is not
informative because there were so few good learners, and there was only weak evidence for
differences between the test items in the low-differentiation condition, though by no means
completely absent. (Figure 3 about here)
In addition, the differences in training trial performance in the standard condition’s
test block were quite stable because they correspond to similar differences throughout the
course of learning. Figure 4 shows learning curves for different training trial types by
condition (Table 1) in terms of proportions of category A responses averaged into sets of 5
training blocks and based on all participants. As in the test data in Figure 2, exemplars A1,
A2, and A3 as well as B3 and B4 were the easiest to learn in the standard condition and this
pattern persisted throughout learning. On the other hand, the training items were only weakly
different from each other in the low-differentiation condition (on the right in Figure 4) as
emphasized by the fact that some category A items were not even systematically
differentiated from the category B items. (Figure 4 about here)
The most compelling evidence for category influences on learning in the standard
condition comes from a comparison of individual category instances that had the same
category assignment in both the standard and low-differentiation conditions and were learned
well in the standard task. Consider A2 1212 (shown by squares connected with solid lines in
both conditions in Figure 4). There were systematic differences between conditions
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throughout learning for this item with strong assignment to category A in the standard
condition and weak assignment to category B in the low-differentiation condition (despite the
feedback to the contrary in the low-differentiation condition). Likewise, B4 2222 (shown by
circles connected by dashed lines in both conditions in Figure 4) was quite strongly assigned
to category B in the standard condition throughout learning, but weakly assigned to A
throughout most of learning in the low-differentiation condition. The remaining category
instances were not as clearly differentiated between the conditions, but these instances were
not learned particularly well in the standard condition in the first place.
In summary, category membership in the standard 5-4 structure has a pronounced but
differential influence on the learnability of exemplars both in reference to each other and to
members of a more poorly differentiated 5-4 structure. Further these differences are
conceptually not compatible with participants treating the standard task pragmatically as an
identification learning task with no generalization across instances and no category influences
on learning. Overall, these data indicate that there are category influences on learning of the
standard Medin and Schaffer (1978) 5-4 category structure despite a lack of category
advantage for that structure (Blair & Homa, 2003) and despite the difficulty of learning it. In
addition, exemplar modelling supports this category influence conclusion.
Exemplar Modelling of the Results
Results from the 5-4 category structure have been modelled and discussed many times
in the past (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 2000; Smith & Minda, 2000; etc.), so it will
come as no surprise that the exemplar model provides a good account of the results from the
present experiment as detailed below. However the deeper purpose of this modelling analysis
is to take a closer look at how the exemplar model accounts for the results in the context of
two contrasting conclusions: firstly, Blair and Homa’s (2003) no-category-advantage
conclusion that this category structure induces instance memorization with no generalization
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across instances and, secondly, the fact that there are clear category influences on learning for
this structure.
Category learning research has commonly instituted a learning criterion such that only
those participants who have learned the categories sufficiently well are included in the key
data set, which is then used to address primary research questions such as how participants
represent categories, use them, etc. Moreover the assessment of the participant proportions
who reach the various criteria for the 5-4 structure have lead Blair and Homa (2003) as well
as Smith and Minda (2002) to emphasize the relative difficulty of learning this structure, with
substantial proportions of participants not learning to criterion. However, we have focused on
modelling the results for all participants as conceptually a learning criterion has the potential
to compress or mask differences in instance learnability against a ceiling of perfect
performance.
Figure 5 shows the exemplar model’s best fit predictions plotted against the data from
the standard and low-differentiation conditions respectively. (The details of the model and the
maximum likelihood modelling procedure can be found in the Appendix.) The model does a
reasonable job of accounting for the data in both conditions with an overall fit of G2 =
10.270 corresponding to a Root Mean Squared Deviation (RMSD) of 0.053 for the standard
condition2 (with dimensional attention parameters of 0.369, 0.108, 0.297, and 0.227, for the
four dimensions respectively, and a similarity scaling parameter of c = 4.040) and with an
overall fit of G2 = 15.146 corresponding to RMSD = 0.073 for the low-differentiation
condition3 (with dimensional attention parameters of 0.406, 0.100, 0.339, and 0.155,
respectively, and a similarity scaling parameter of c = 2.746). (Figure 5 about here)
Tables 2 and 3 also show the exemplar model’s predictions for the standard and low-
differentiation conditions by trial type, where the data and model prediction values for each
trial type are the data points in the scatter plots shown in Figures 5. In particular, the column
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in Tables 2 and 3 labelled “SumSim A” has the sum of each test item’s similarities to all the
exemplars in category A, and “SumSim B” is the sum of the item’s similarities to all the
exemplars in category B. If a test item perfectly matches an exemplar in the category
representation, then its similarity to that exemplar is 1.0. Since the training items, A1-B4, all
exactly match one item, the extent to which the summed category similarities for these items
are greater than 1.0 partly indexes a category influence on responding, that is, the influence of
exemplars other than the perfectly matching memorized instance. As none of the training
items A1-B4 were members of both categories, a training item never perfectly matched an
exemplar in the opposite category, so the summed similarity to exemplars of the opposite can
be less than 1.0, but it doesn’t have to be as the cumulative similarity to multiple exemplars
has the potential to be greater than 1.0.
The training items from the standard condition can be divided into high accuracy
items—A1, A2, A3, B3, and B4—and low accuracy items--A4, A5, B1, and B2—in Figure 2.
It is important to emphasize that this is not just an arbitrary division, but one both strongly
suggested by the standard condition learning curves (Figure 4) and widely replicated. For
example, this pattern of testing trial accuracies occurred in Medin and Schaffer’s (1978)
Experiment 3 shown at the bottom of Figure 3, in the various additional data sets summarized
in Figure 7, and in the average data from 30 replications of this category structure reported by
Smith and Minda (2000).
For the high accuracy training items from the standard condition, the average of the
summed similarity to members of their own category in Table 2 is 1.92. If self-similarity is
removed from this by subtracting 1, then the proportion of category similarity due to other
exemplars is 0.92/1.93 = 0.48, or roughly half of the category similarity. In contrast, the
average summed similarity for low-accuracy training items was 1.36, so the proportion due to
other category exemplars is 0.36/1.36 = 0.26, or only about one quarter of the category
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similarity. Correspondingly, the average summed similarities of the high accuracy training
items (Table 2) to members of the opposite category was quite low, 0.40, while twice as high
for the low accuracy items, 0.80.
(Table 2 about here)
The division of the low-differentiation condition training items (Table 3) into a high
accuracy set—A1, A3, A5, B1, and B3—and a low accuracy set—A2, A4, B2, and B4—was
somewhat more arbitrary because this structure was much harder to learn and the specific
item learning curves in Figure 4 were more poorly differentiated. However, even in this very
poorly differentiated category structure, the average summed similarity for high accuracy
items to members of their own category in Table 3 was 2.02 versus 1.64 for the low accuracy
items. With self-similarity removed, the proportion of category similarity due to other
exemplars was 0.51 for high accuracy items and 0.39 for low-accuracy items. So even for this
poorly differentiated structure the amount of category influence was somewhat larger for high
than low accuracy items, though the difference was not as large as for the standard condition
data. But the key difference from this account of the standard condition was that for the low-
differentiation condition, average summed similarity to members of the contrast category for
high accuracy items was 1.13 and was 1.54 for low accuracy items. Hence contrast category
similarity was substantially higher in the model’s account of the low-differentiation condition
as would be expected from the poorer differentiation compared to the standard structure.
(Table 3 about here)
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In summary, the purpose of this assessment is not to argue that prior modelling
analysis of data from this category structure contrasting exemplar and prototype theory is
wrong. Rather the purpose has been to look at how the exemplar model accounts for the data
in the context of the claim that learning is based on instance memorization without
generalization between instances. The exemplar model explains the differences in training
item accuracy observed in the data in terms of differential category influences on learning
from both the member and contrast categories, that is differential generalization across
multiple instances. In fact, we propose it is the relatively poor differentiation of these
category structures that enhances differential item learnability and makes arguing for
nongeneralizing exemplars so implausible. While selective attention helps people and the
exemplar model to differentiate the categories and so achieve high training item accuracy in
the first place, differential within and between category similarity compellingly explains
differential learnability. The latter is very hard to explain, in contrast, if this categorization
task is equivalent to an identification learning task with no exemplar crosstalk.
Experiment 2
The basic claim we have critiqued in Experiment 1 is that learning of the 5-4 category
structure just invokes simple instance memorization with no generalization across instances.
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to provide a methodological contrast to the standard
learning with feedback paradigm used in Experiment 1 and substantially emphasize
memorization by explicitly telling participants to memorize the category instances from a
simultaneously presented summary (Figure 6). The basic intent of this paradigm was to
induce participants to encode the category instances from the standard condition (on the left
in Table 1) into memory in as methodologically simple a way as possible. In the standard
category learning paradigm, participants learn a category structure by categorizing single
instances over a protracted series of trials with feedback where the resulting error drives
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selective attention and gradually improves associative performance. Conceptually, selective
attention driven by explicit feedback might operate to make cross-instance similarity more
differential than it might otherwise have been. In contrast, participants in this experiment
were simultaneously presented with the instances from the standard 5-4 structure (on the left
in Table 1) grouped with category labels (Figure 6) and explicitly instructed to memorize
them in a short interval. Thus participants received no feedback because there were no
responses and no trial structure. (Figure 6 about here)
Method
Participants
There were 30 participants, who were undergraduate students at University College London
or Cardiff University.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were instructed to memorize the instances from two categories on a category
summary sheet as shown in Figure 6. The category instances were described as being rocket
ships from Planets A and B. After being given 5 minutes to memorize these instances, the
summary sheet was removed, and participants were asked to assign each of the 16 cases from
the standard condition in Table 1 to one of the categories by circling one of the two possible
category labels below the instance (Planet A or Planet B). For methodological simplicity, the
presentation order of the test trials was the same for all participants—T1, T4, T2, T3, T5, T6,
T7, A1, B4, B1, A5, A3, A4, B3, A2, and B2—as was the assignment of abstract to physical
dimensions—Dimension 1 = wing width (1=narrow/2=wide), Dimension 2 = cone shape
(1=curved/2=pointed) dimension 3 = booster number(1/2) and Dimension 4 = portal
orientation (1=down/2=up).
Results and Discussion
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Overall categorization performance on the 9 category instances resulted in an average
accuracy of 0.73 based on all participants. Comparison with various published learning
results from the standard paradigm and different numbers of training blocks, on the right in
Figure 7, shows that this is similar to that observed in the learning results from after a full 16
blocks of training, 0.72 (Nosofsky, Palmeri & McKinley, 1994), where each block had all 9
category instances for a total of 144 trials. Thus the overall performance level obtained with
the present explicit memorization task is highly consistent with one aspect of Blair and
Homa’s (2003) argument, that participants in the standard paradigm memorize the instances
of the 5-4 category structure. (Figure 7 about here)
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that categorization performance on the 9 category
instances, A1-B4, was highly varied, ranging from almost chance accuracy (e.g., instance
B1), to more than 90% accuracy (instance B4). Importantly, this variation was not random
but rather was systematic and highly correlated with the published learning results based on
different amounts of training in the standard trial-by-trial learning with feedback paradigm
(the right panels of Figure 7), e.g. r = 0.92 with results from after 32 blocks of training
(Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; Nosofsky, Palmeri and McKinley, 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky,
1995). In particular, these results duplicated the same differences in training item accuracy
observed in the standard condition of Experiment 1 both at the end of learning (Figure 2) and
over the course of learning (Figure 4), that is, higher accuracy on A1-A3, B3, and B4 than on
A4, A5, B1, and B2. And lastly, the generalization test results for T1-T7 showed a moderate
level of correspondence to those from the learning reference data, most notably in terms of a
large prototype effect for T3, the prototype of category B.
The comparability of these to prior results demonstrates that not only were there
differences in accuracy for the category members but that this methodologically simple
paradigm produced results that are surprisingly similar to those from the far more elaborate
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multi-trial learning with feedback paradigm. In the context of the dual-system prototype
theory being considered here, there are two contrasting interpretations that can be drawn from
these results depending on whether they are considered to represent the complete ablation or
the active facilitation of the mind’s categorization system, as distinct from the
nongeneralizing-exemplar-memorization system.
One perspective is to use the minimalist instance-memorization paradigm to argue
that the explicit memorization instructions should even more strongly invoke instance
memorization and hence even more completely ablate the categorization system. In addition,
the lack of feedback might further minimize the effects of selective attention and similarity,
also arguably key components of the categorization system, and leave responding to be firmly
based on the nongeneralizing instance memorization system. From this perspective, the fact
that the differences in training item accuracy in this experiment so closely replicate those
from the standard paradigm strongly argues against nongeneralizing exemplars in the dual-
system theory. So even when instances are encoded into memory in as simple a way as
possible there are still clear category influences, and it is not clear from the perspective of
parsimony what the dual-system account adds here.
However, an alternative perspective is that our instance-memorization paradigm had
the exact opposite of the desired effect; far from completely ablating the categorization
system, maybe this paradigm actively facilitated the categorization system by allowing
participants to more easily observe the commonalities and differences between instances,
both within and between categories. That is, the summary presentation methodology
effectively enhanced the perceived differentiation of the categories and thus actually
activated rather than ablated the categorization system. Probably the most compelling
evidence for this perspective is that the summary memorization paradigm produced a large
prototype effect during the testing phase (T3), as large as that in the extensive training
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condition from Johansen and Palmeri (2002). But if the summary memorization results
represent enhanced performance of the activated categorization system then that system
produced results that look remarkably similar to those from the standard task in Experiment 1
which are so well accounted for by the exemplar model in terms of generalizing across
multiple category instances. Thus from the perspective of parsimony, it is unclear what dual-
system prototype theory with nongeneralizing exemplar memory is adding in this alternative
interpretation.
General Discussion
The two experiments presented here evaluated category influences on instance
learnability in the 5-4 category structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) from two different
methodological perspectives. Experiment 1 contrasted feedback learning in the standard 5-4
structure with learning in an even more poorly differentiated category structure generated by
switching the category assignment of two pairs of instances. Blair and Homa (2003)
compared the standard category learning task with an identification learning task and argued
that the comparable learnability of the two tasks indicated a lack of “category advantage”,
which they took as evidence that responding was based on instance memorization with no
generalization across instances. However, the present results indicate that a more poorly
differentiated category structure was even harder to learn, a difficult result to explain if
multiple category instances are not influencing responding, particularly as there were
systematic differences in performance across category instances. Further, as would be
expected from the history of this category structure, the exemplar model provided a good
account of these data. In particular, it accounted for the differential learnability of the training
items in terms of differential similarity to multiple instances both within and between
categories. In essence, Experiment 1 uses a variation of Blair and Homa’s category advantage
methodology to show an advantage in learning some instances in the standard 5-4 structure
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compared to a less differentiated category structure. Pure instance memorization without
generalization cannot explain this observation.
Experiment 2 was a minimalist memorization task where participants were presented
with a simultaneous display of all the category instances (Figure 6) and given 5 minutes to
memorize them. The results of this task look strikingly like those from the standard category
learning paradigm (e.g., Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky,
Palmeri and McKinley, 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995), despite the large differences in the
methodology. While this suggests that instance memorization is a fundamental part of that
paradigm–consistent with the claims of Blair and Homa (2003) and Smith and Minda (2000;
also Smith, 2005)–these findings also indicate that even this simple way of encoding
instances into memory resulted in a category influence on learning and generalization. This
category influence is based on comparison to more than one instance and yields clear
prototypicality effects, even though this poorly differentiated category structure putatively
does not lend itself to anything other than the memorization of specific instances with no
generalization across multiple instances: “The lack of a category advantage . . . strongly
suggests that participants who learn these categories learn them by memorization and receive
no benefit from generalizing among members of the same category” (Blair & Homa, 2003, p.
1298).
At minimum, these results suggest that the conclusions from Blair and Homa’s (2003)
category advantage methodology should be viewed with caution. Their argument is that lack
of category advantage for category learning compared to identification learning indicates a
poorly differentiated category structure unrepresentative of real world categories which does
not invoke the brain’s categorization system and which is dealt with only by instance
memory. Our counterargument is that even for this poorly differentiated category structure,
there are still clear category influences.
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We suggest that the problem with Blair and Homa’s (2003) category advantage
argument is as follows: While categorization solely in reference to single memorized
instances certainly predicts a lack of a category advantage, a lack of category advantage does
not necessarily imply that categorization performance is based on memorized single instances
without a category influence of multiple instances. The lack of category advantage can arise
for other reasons in the presence of a category influence. For example, the crosstalk between
individual instances may be such that learning is facilitated for some and harmed for others
and thus average out to being comparable to identification learning, but this category
influence at the level of specific instances may not be apparent from looking at an overall
learning rate.
More generally, it thus seems that even an elaborated dual-system prototype theory
which has been paradoxically motivated to make predictions about instance memory fails. If
category decisions are based on more than one instance in the memorization system, as our
results suggest, then this system should generate prototype effects, typicality gradients, and
so on and the added theoretical value of a separate prototype-based ‘true’ categorization
system becomes unclear. In effect, prototype theory’s separate memory store for instances
would be generating categorization behaviour in a similar way to exemplar theory’s single
system, at which point it is reasonable to ask: what is the prototype-based categorization
system serving to explain?
There are several possible ripostes to this conclusion. One is to argue that the dual
system prototype plus nongeneralizing exemplar theory we have considered is effectively just
a straw man. However, given past criticisms of the 5-4 structure (Blair & Homa, 2003; Smith
& Minda, 2000; etc.) and the absence of a “category advantage” with this structure, the
theory is anything but a straw man. It is distinctly non-trivial, explains a range of findings,
and the experiments reported here could, in principle, have yielded further support. The
Instance Memorization and Category Influence 33
following reasonably summarizes this dual-system position (Blair & Homa, 2003, p. 1299):
“Data from previous research using the 5-4 categories has been difficult for prototype models
to fit, and these data are generally seen as supporting exemplar theories. If one assumes a
strong relationship between memorization and categorization, then the failure of a prototype
model can be seen as a critical weakness of the theory. If one assumes that there is little or no
relationship between memorization and categorization, then the 5-4 category learning task
has little to do with categorization and is therefore an inappropriate test of prototype theory.”
Another possible riposte to our conclusions is that the theoretical debate has moved
on from the coarse distinction between exemplar generalization versus nongeneralization to
the more subtle distinctions between typicality gradients (e.g., Homa, et al. 2011). We have
summarized our reactions to the dot-distortion paradigm in the introduction. In addition, our
differences in instance and category learnability provide some converging support for recent
developments in theories of category intuitiveness involving assessments of what makes
categories hard or easy to learn (Pothos & Bailey, 2009; Pothos et al., 2011; Pothos, Edwards,
& Perlman. 2011). We would like to emphasize the overall logic and minimal conclusions of
our research. We take our results as evidence for exemplar theory and thus still consider it a
viable candidate to explain broad areas of categorization behaviour, perhaps even all
categorization behaviour (with suitable elaboration). However, we acknowledge that some
may consider research on the 5-4 category structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) to have
reached a state of theoretical sterility, perhaps because they believe that such binary-valued
category structures are unrepresentative of the real world or because they believe that
prototypes clearly provide a better account of typicality gradients, even when multiple
exemplars are allowed to generalize between each other. Nevertheless, even if both of these
are completely true, we believe that Blair and Homa’s (2003) antiexemplar category-
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advantage argument is not viable and at minimum this evidence against exemplar theory
should be discounted and future prototype theories suitably constrained.
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Footnote
1. Structural ratio as a measurement does not have a fixed upper bound corresponding to
perfect differentiation as, among other reasons, sharing zero features with instances of
a contrast category leaves the ratio undefined to avoid division by 0. But some
indication of a relevant upper bound can be had by making all of the instances of
category A identical to the category prototype, A 1111, and likewise the B instances
to B 2222 except for one B instance which shares a single feature with A, i.e. B2221.
In this case the structural ratio is 3.8/0.3 = 12.7, clearly a very long way from the 1.5
for the standard 5-4 structure.
2. Fitting the model with RMSD directly rather than G2 resulted in a virtually identical
fit and set of parameters as well as predicted values: RMSD = 0.053, with
dimensional attention parameters of 0.371, 0.102, 0.301, and 0.226, respectively, and
a similarity scaling parameter of c = 4.031. The (unreported) scatterplot of the
model’s predictions against the data was virtually identical to the left panel of Figure
5.
3. Fitting the model with RMSD directly rather than G2 also resulted in extremely
similar parameters, fit, and predictions for these data: with dimensional attention
parameters of 0.403, 0.126, 0.321, and 0.150, respectively, and a similarity scaling
parameter of c = 2.959). The (unreported) model predictions were also very similar to
those in the right panel of Figure 5.
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Appendix
Exemplar Model Specification and Modelling Procedure
The exemplar model applied to the results of Experiment 1 was the Generalized Context
Model (Nosofsky, 1986). In overview, the model calculates the total similarity of a test item
to all the instances in a category and then specifies a category response probability by
contrasting that category’s summed similarity with the total similarity to all categories. The
predictions from the model for these data were derived using the following two equations,
four free parameters, and a best fitting parameter procedure.
In detail, each category is represented in the model by the instances composing it, the
exemplars participants were told in the training phase were in that category (for example A1-
A5 for category A in Table 1), each composed of features on four binary-valued feature
dimensions. The model specifies the similarity of a given test item, i, to a given category
exemplar, j, using equation 1.






 
k
jkikkij xxwc
dim
||exp (1)
In this equation, ikx is the feature value of test item i on feature dimension k, and
correspondingly jkx is the feature value of exemplar j on the same feature dimension k. The
absolute value of the difference between these two features, || jkik xx  , is then multiplied by
the dimensional attention parameter for feature dimension k, kw ,which specifies how much a
feature difference on that dimension should matter in the similarity calculation. These
weighted differences are calculated for all four feature dimensions, summed and multiplied
by -c to yield the content of the parentheses in equation 1, where c is an overall scaling
parameter for similarity. This scaled sum of weighted feature difference values is then
exponentiated to give the similarity of test item i to exemplar j, ij .
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Using the similarities generated by equation 1, the category response probability that a test
item i will be from category A is determined by equation 2. Specifically, the model calculates






catBj
ij
catAj
ij
catAj
ij
icatAP


)|( (2)
the total similarity of a test item i to all the instances in category A by summing across its
similarity to each of the specific instances in that category as in the numerator of equation 2,

catAj
ij . This summed similarity to the representation for category A is divided by the
summed similarity to all the instances in both categories, category A on the left and category
B on the right in the denominator.
The model’s best fitting predictions for the data in a given condition of Experiment 1
were generated by adjusting the free parameters to minimize the maximum likelihood statistic
G2. We have not drawn any statistical conclusions about the goodness of fit of this model
because the data substantially violate independence. In practice, using G2 resulted in very
similar predictions to the more traditional procedure of minimizing root mean squared
deviation (RMSD), the discrepancy between the model’s predictions and the data. So even
though the fits used G2, we also report RMSD to be comparable to previously reported fits of
this model. Of the model’s four dimensional attention parameters, kw , in equation 1, three
are free parameters and the fourth is constrained such that the sum of the four attention
parameters is 1. The overall similarity scaling parameter c is a free parameter rather than
simply being redundant with the four attention parameters by the distributive rule. Various
sets of initial free parameter values were chosen and adjusted via a hill-climbing procedure.
The model’s best fitting parameter values and predictions for the two conditions of Table 1
are reported in the main text.
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Table 1. Standard 5-4 Category Structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978), Low-differentiation 5-4
structure, and Test Cases Used in Experiment 1’s Standard and Low-differentiation
Conditions.
trial types standard low-differentiation
A1 A 1 1 1 2 A 2 2 2 1
A2 A 1 2 1 2 A 1 2 1 2
A3 A 1 2 1 1 A 2 1 1 2
A4 A 1 1 2 1 A 1 1 2 1
A5 A 2 1 1 1 A 2 1 1 1
B1 B 1 1 2 2 B 1 1 2 2
B2 B 2 1 1 2 B 1 2 1 1
B3 B 2 2 2 1 B 1 1 1 2
B4 B 2 2 2 2 B 2 2 2 2
T1 ? 1 2 2 1 ? 1 2 2 1
T2 ? 1 2 2 2 ? 1 2 2 2
T3 ? 1 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
T4 ? 2 2 1 2 ? 2 2 1 2
T5 ? 2 1 2 1 ? 2 1 2 1
T6 ? 2 2 1 1 ? 2 2 1 1
T7 ? 2 1 2 2 ? 2 1 2 2
Note. In the test cases, ?’s indicate that there was no correct category as participants never
received feedback for these items. The category instance trial type labels A1-B4 are for
reference purposes only as are the generalization test trial labels T1-T7. The two bold
instances in each category of the low-differentiation condition were members of the other
category in the standard category structure in the middle column. Specifically, A1 and A3 in
the low-differentiation condition are B3 and B2, respectively, in the standard condition, and
B2 and B3 in the low-differentiation condition are A3 and A1, respectively, in the standard
condition.
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Table 2. Exemplar Model Predictions for the Standard Condition from Experiment 1.
trial types standard data model SumSim A SumSim B
A1 A 1 1 1 2 0.78 0.78 2.12 0.59
A2 A 1 2 1 2 0.83 0.83 2.18 0.44
A3 A 1 2 1 1 0.88 0.90 2.00 0.23
A4 A 1 1 2 1 0.68 0.70 1.46 0.63
A5 A 2 1 1 1 0.68 0.66 1.36 0.70
B1 B 1 1 2 2 0.33 0.44 1.00 1.27
B2 B 2 1 1 2 0.40 0.39 0.86 1.34
B3 B 2 2 2 1 0.30 0.23 0.45 1.54
B4 B 2 2 2 2 0.05 0.14 0.28 1.74
T1 ? 1 2 2 1 0.70 0.67 1.19 0.59
T2 ? 1 2 2 2 0.48 0.47 0.89 1.01
T3 ? 1 1 1 1 0.83 0.87 1.83 0.27
T4 ? 2 2 1 2 0.43 0.40 0.74 1.11
T5 ? 2 1 2 1 0.30 0.36 0.62 1.12
T6 ? 2 2 1 1 0.50 0.60 1.07 0.70
T7 ? 2 1 2 2 0.20 0.19 0.34 1.43
Note. Both the data and model predictions are in terms of category A response proportions.
SumSim A indicates each test item’s summed similarity to all the exemplars of category A,
and SumSim B to all the exemplars of category B.
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Table 3. Exemplar Model Predictions for the Low-differentiation Condition from Experiment
1.
trial types low-differentiation Data model SumSim A SumSim B
A1 A 2 2 2 1 0.61 0.64 1.83 1.01
A2 A 1 2 1 2 0.46 0.48 1.69 1.84
A3 A 2 1 1 2 0.63 0.70 2.18 0.92
A4 A 1 1 2 1 0.54 0.55 1.66 1.37
A5 A 2 1 1 1 0.63 0.75 2.25 0.74
B1 B 1 1 2 2 0.34 0.42 1.33 1.84
B2 B 1 2 1 1 0.37 0.46 1.49 1.78
B3 B 1 1 1 2 0.32 0.45 1.62 1.99
B4 B 2 2 2 2 0.39 0.50 1.44 1.43
T1 ? 1 2 2 1 0.51 0.54 1.51 1.30
T2 ? 1 2 2 2 0.37 0.44 1.27 1.64
T3 ? 1 1 1 1 0.39 0.47 1.53 1.73
T4 ? 2 2 1 2 0.68 0.67 1.91 0.96
T5 ? 2 1 2 1 0.61 0.67 1.80 0.89
T6 ? 2 2 1 1 0.68 0.71 1.96 0.81
T7 ? 2 1 2 2 0.61 0.53 1.46 1.28
Note. Both the data and model predictions are in terms of category A response proportions.
SumSim A indicates each test item’s summed similarity to all the exemplars of category A,
and SumSim B to all the exemplars of category B.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Experiment 1 training condition accuracy averaged across sets of five training
blocks for all participants (top panel) and for poorer learners (bottom panel) who did not
ultimately achieve the learning criterion of  ≥ 0.75 in the last two blocks of training (error 
bars are standard errors).
Figure 2. Experiment 1 test trial response proportions by training condition with an
approximate 95% binomial confidence interval on the population proportion of 0.5 (based on
n = 40 for simplicity).
Figure 3. Experiment 1 test trial response proportions by training condition separated for high
and low accuracy participants in reference to a learning criterion, ≥ 0.75 average accuracy in 
the last two training blocks. Data from Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) Experiment 3 are shown
for reference.
Figure 4. Experiment 1 category A response proportions by condition and with mean block
accuracy averaged across sets of five training blocks for all participants (errors bar are
standard errors).
Figure 5. Exemplar model best fit predictions for the standard and low-differentiation
conditions of Experiment 1.
Figure 6. Category summary sheet from Experiment 2 with instances from two categories
corresponding to the abstract category structure for the standard condition in Table 1.
Figure 7. Average data for the explicit memorization task from Experiment 2 in terms of
Category A response proportions, left panel. The last three panels are test results after 16
blocks, 25 blocks, and 32 blocks, respectively, of trial-by-trial feedback learning for the
standard 5-4 category structure shown on the left in Table 1 (Johansen & Palmeri, 2002;
Nosofsky et al., 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995). The dashed line is the guessing
performance reference at 0.5 because there were two categories.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 training condition accuracy averaged across sets of five training
blocks for all participants (top panel) and for poorer learners (bottom panel) who did not
ultimately achieve the learning criterion of  ≥ 0.75 in the last two blocks of training (error 
bars are standard errors).
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 test trial response proportions by training condition with an
approximate 95% binomial confidence interval on the population proportion of 0.5 (based on
n = 40 for simplicity).
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 test trial response proportions by training condition separated for high
and low accuracy participants in reference to a learning criterion, ≥ 0.75 average accuracy in 
the last two training blocks. Data from Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) Experiment 3 are shown
for reference.
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Figure 4. Experiment 1 category A response proportions by condition and with mean block
accuracy averaged across sets of five training blocks for all participants (errors bar are
standard errors).
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Figure 5. Exemplar model best fit predictions for the standard and low-differentiation
conditions of Experiment 1.
Instance Memorization and Category Influence 52
Figure 6. Category summary sheet from Experiment 2 with instances from two categories
corresponding to the abstract category structure for the standard condition in Table 1.
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Figure 7. Average data for the explicit memorization task from Experiment 2 in terms of
Category A response proportions, left panel. The last three panels are test results after 16
blocks, 25 blocks, and 32 blocks, respectively, of trial-by-trial feedback learning for the
standard 5-4 category structure shown on the left in Table 1 (Johansen & Palmeri, 2002;
Nosofsky et al., 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995). The dashed line is the guessing
performance reference at 0.5 because there were two categories.
